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When the Software We Buy Is Not Actually Ours:  
An Analysis of Vernor v. Autodesk on the First 
Sale Doctrine and Essential Step Defense 
By Terence Leong* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  While software copyright owners generally have broad discretion to license and 
protect their copyrighted software, there are several affirmative defenses that an alleged 
infringer can invoke, including the first sale doctrine1 and the essential step defense.2  A 
threshold issue to invoke either defense requires the infringer to be an “owner” of the 
software in question. 
¶2  Circuits are split regarding whether software licensees are owners of their licensed 
software.  The recent Ninth Circuit decision in Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. holds that a user 
of software under a restrictive licensing scheme is not an owner of the software and 
therefore cannot invoke affirmative copyright infringement defenses.3  Contrary to 
Vernor, decisions in the Second and Federal Circuits, and even decisions in the Ninth 
Circuit before Vernor, suggest that software licensees’ rights are like those of an owner 
of the software. 
¶3  This Note asks the question of how software licensing fits within the copyright 
regime, focusing on an investigation of Vernor and the implications on affirmative 
defenses for copyright infringement.  Part II provides an overview of the first sale 
doctrine, the essential step defense, and the copyrightability of software in general.  Part 
III investigates the issue of ownership versus licensee in the circuits prior to the Vernor 
decision.  Part IV discusses the facts in Vernor and analyzes the decisions of both the 
district court and the Ninth Circuit.  Part V explores the policy arguments of each party to 
the case.  In Part VI, this Note compares Vernor to decisions in other circuits, specifically 
the split with the Second Circuit.  Finally, Part VII concludes with a proposal to resolve 
the split. 
II. OVERVIEW OF LIMITS ON THE RIGHTS OF SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS 
¶4  The federal copyright regime finds its origin in the Copyright Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, which grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
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1 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006). 
2 See id. § 117(a)(1). 
3 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2010). 




to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”4  The Copyright Clause incentivizes the 
production of creative works by serving the interests of two opposing parties:  authors 
and consumers of the works.  It serves the interests of the author and incentivizes creation 
by granting authors exclusive rights in their works.  The Copyright Act codifies this goal 
by enumerating copyright owners’ exclusive rights, enabling the copyright owners to 
control their works.5  An individual is liable for damages for violating these exclusive 
rights.6  One way in which the Copyright Clause serves consumers and fosters the 
widespread dissemination of knowledge is by limiting those exclusive rights to “limited 
[t]imes.”  Additionally, there are several provisions of the Copyright Act that limit the 
exclusive rights of authors, two of which are discussed below. 
A. Limit on the Exclusive Distribution Right:  The First Sale Doctrine 
¶5  The first sale doctrine, which allows owners of copies of a copyrighted work to 
resell that work after the initial purchase, represents a balance struck in common law 
between the conflicting interests of copyright holders and the public.  Copyright holders 
possess the exclusive right to distribute copies of their work, including selling, renting, 
leasing, and lending the work.7  This exclusive distribution right aims to protect the rights 
of copyright owners, but often it conflicts with the overall copyright goal of promoting 
information exchange.8  If the distribution right were unchecked, copyright owners would 
be the only individuals who could authorize any distribution of their works.  Not 
surprisingly, copyright holders historically have attempted to place restrictions on the 
alienability of copyrighted items. 
¶6  The first sale doctrine developed in common law in response to this difficulty.  The 
Supreme Court, articulating the first sale doctrine in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 
recognized that 
copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the copyright in his right to 
multiply and sell his production, do not create the right to impose . . . a limitation 
at which the [copyrighted work] shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with 
whom there is no privity of contract.9 
The first sale doctrine was later codified in § 109 of the Copyright Act in much the same 
form articulated in Bobbs-Merrill.10  A major limitation on the first sale doctrine under 
§ 109 is that only the owner of a particular copy of a copyrighted work may raise the 
defense.11 
 
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
5 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
6 Id. § 501(a). 
7 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). 
8 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62 (1976). 
9 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908). 
10 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or 
any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”). 
11 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1112 n.13 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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B. Limit on the Exclusive Reproduction Right:  The Essential Step Defense 
¶7  Copyright owners have the exclusive right to reproduce their copyrighted work.12  
The exclusive reproduction right grants copyright owners the exclusive right to make 
copies of their copyrighted work.13  The essential step defense, like the first sale doctrine, 
limits an exclusive right of copyright owners.  The essential step defense, as codified in 
§ 117(a), is an exception to the reproduction right.  It provides that the owner of a copy of 
a computer program can copy a copyrighted computer program if that copy is necessary 
to operate the computer.14  The essential step defense arose in response to the common 
practice of computers making temporary cached copies of software during the ordinary 
running of that computer.15  Without this defense, each computer user could potentially 
be liable for copyright infringement. 
C. Software Copyrightability 
¶8  Courts as well as Congress have struggled to determine the appropriate mode of 
protection for software.  Courts have generally broadened the scope of software protected 
by copyright law, including operating systems16 and nonliteral elements of software.17  
However, largely because of the intrinsically functional nature of software, courts have 
declined to apply copyright protection to other aspects of software, such as menu 
hierarchies.18 
III. PRE-VERNOR DECISIONS 
¶9  To assert a defense under either the first sale doctrine or the essential step defense, 
an alleged infringer must be an owner of the software.19  Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Vernor, there were two views on whether a software licensee is an owner for 
purposes of the first sale doctrine and the essential step defense.  The first view, 
articulated by the Ninth Circuit, favors software copyright owners’ rights to contract and 
limit the scope of end-user licenses.  The second view, adopted by the Second Circuit, the 
Federal Circuit, and even in some Ninth Circuit decisions, sees the rights of software 
licensees as analogous to the rights of owners. 
 
12 Id. § 106(1). 
13 Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (indicating the exclusive reproduction right is intended to give 
the owner of a copyright “the right to produce a material object in which the work is duplicated . . . in a 
fixed form from which it can be ‘perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated’”). 
14 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (indicating such copying is not infringement provided “that such a new copy or 
adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a 
machine and that it is used in no other manner”). 
15 See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08 (2009). 
16 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). 
17 Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
18 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
19 The first sale doctrine requires that a claimant be an “owner of a particular copy” of the copyrighted 
work. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).  Likewise, the essential step defense requires that an alleged infringer be the 
“owner of a copy” of copyrighted software. Id. § 117(a). 




A. The Ninth Circuit:  Software Licensees Do Not Have Owner Rights 
¶10  The Ninth Circuit, generally seen as favorable to copyright owners, has considered 
software purchasers to be licensees rather than owners.  In United States v. Wise, a 
criminal infringement case, the Ninth Circuit took one of the earliest looks at the 
relationship between the first sale doctrine and licenses.20  The defendant in Wise 
operated a mail-order film business that sold copyrighted full length motion picture reels 
to film collectors throughout the country.21  The issue was whether the defendant had the 
right under the first sale doctrine to re-sell the films that he obtained.  None of the films 
that Wise sold were “subject to an outright sale” in their first transactions.22  Instead, the 
transfers looked a lot more like licenses because the film studios licensed the films “for 
limited purposes and for limited periods of time,” “reserved title to the films in the 
studios[,] and required [the films’] return at the expiration of the license period.”23  
Interpreting the first sale doctrine, the court stated that the “statute requires a transfer of 
title before a ‘first sale’ can occur.”24  The court held that these film licenses were not 
first sales because “on their face and by their terms they were restricted licenses and not 
sales.”25 
¶11  However, the Wise court distinguished two licenses as sales—the Funny Girl and 
Camelot films.  Wise sold a display license for Funny Girl to ABC that allowed ABC to 
retain, at its election and cost, a file-screening copy of the film.26  In the absence of any 
evidence that ABC exercised its right to retain a copy, the court found that the 
government had not proven the absence of a first sale.27  The Camelot license, which 
Wise granted to a collector named Vanessa Redgrave, stipulated that Redgrave pay 
Warner Brothers, the owner of the Camelot copyright, for the print and that the print was 
limited to home use.28  Therefore, the court held that there was a first sale with regard to 
Camelot, as well, because Redgrave was given control of the copy of Camelot for an 
unlimited amount of time.29 
¶12  The Ninth Circuit dealt with the licensee versus owner issue in the context of 
software sales in what the Vernor court deemed the MAI trio of cases.30  The MAI trio 
consists of:  MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,31 Triad Systems Corp. v. 
Southeastern Express Co.,32 and Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department.33  In each of these cases, the Ninth Circuit discussed both the essential step 
defense and the first sale doctrine.  While the cases involve different software licensing 
 
20 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977). 
21 Id. at 1183–84. 
22 Id. at 1184. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 1187. 
25 Id. at 1190. 
26 Id. at 1191. 
27 Id. at 1191–92 (“[T]he government ha[d] failed in its burden of proving the absence of first sale . . . .”). 
28 Id. at 1192. 
29 Id. 
30 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2010). 
31 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). 
32 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995). 
33 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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situations, the Ninth Circuit ultimately found that customers who use software under 
restrictive licenses are not owners for purposes of §§ 109 and 117. 
¶13  The trio’s namesake case, MAI, found no ownership where the alleged infringer 
utilized software licensed under a restrictive licensing agreement.34  The defendant in 
MAI, Peak Computer, was a computer maintenance and repair firm that, in the course of 
servicing its clients’ computers, made copies of MAI’s copyrighted software into the 
memory of the computers they were servicing.35  MAI licensed its software to its 
customers under a restrictive license that “d[id] not allow for the use or copying of MAI 
software by third parties such as Peak.”36  Thus, the court held that “any ‘copying’ done 
by Peak [wa]s ‘beyond the scope’ of the license” and therefore not covered by the 
essential step defense.37  On the ownership versus licensee issue, the court stated that 
“[s]ince MAI licensed its software, the Peak customers do not qualify as ‘owners’ of the 
software and are not eligible for protection under § 117.”38  While MAI remains good 
law, it should be noted that Congress explicitly legislated around MAI when it revised 
§ 117 to include a specific exception for computer maintenance.39 
¶14  The second case of the MAI trio, Triad, illustrates the Ninth Circuit’s distinction 
between a sale and a license.40  Triad involved a company that initially sold auto 
maintenance software under a purchase regime, but then switched to a licensing regime.41  
Much like in MAI, the Triad defendants sought service from a third party not authorized 
by Triad, the copyright holder.  The court held that under the purchase regime, the 
customers owned their software and therefore had the right under § 117 to “authorize the 
making of copies in the operation of their computers.”42 
¶15  However, customers under the licensing regime were subject to a strict license that 
stipulated that they “may not duplicate the software or allow it to be used by third 
parties.”43  Furthermore, if customers wished to sell their computer systems with Triad’s 
software on it, the license required them to pay Triad a transfer fee.44  The Triad court 
held that this license was like the license in MAI and that the majority of customers under 
the licensing agreements were licensees.45  Because licensees could not authorize the 
 
34 MAI, 991 F.2d 511, 518 n.5. 
35 Id. at 517. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 519 n.5. 
39 Section 117(c) of the copyright act creates an explicit exception to the exclusive reproduction right for 
purposes of computer maintenance. 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2006).  The legislative history indicates that 
§ 117(c) was passed in response to courts such as the MAI court that interpreted the running of software as 
a § 106 “reproduction.” H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 27 (1998) (“This legislation has the narrow and 
specific intent of relieving independent service providers . . . from liability under the Copyright Act when, 
solely by virtue of activating the machine in which a computer program resides, they inadvertently cause an 
unauthorized copy of that program to be made.”). 
40 See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995). 




45 Id. at 1337 n.18 (“This arrangement is also appropriate because it appears that the majority of Triad 
computer owners are subject to license agreements and do not own their software outright . . . .”). 




making of copies that would be made in the course of repairs, they therefore could not 
use § 117 to authorize repairs.46 
¶16  The final case in the MAI trio, Wall Data, involved a volume license sale where the 
defendant purchased a license to operate 3,663 copies of the plaintiff’s software but 
installed 6,007 copies of the software by using disk-imaging software.47  The defendants 
argued that the essential step defense covered their use of the software “because the hard 
drive imaging process was a necessary step of installation.”48  The court held, however, 
that the defendant was not an owner of the software, stipulating that “if the copyright 
owner makes it clear that she or he is granting only a license to the copy of software and 
imposes significant restrictions on the purchaser’s ability to redistribute or transfer that 
copy, the purchaser is considered a licensee, not an owner, of the software.”49 
B. The Federal and Second Circuits:  Software Licensees Have Owner Rights 
¶17  The Federal and Second Circuits have taken conflicting views of the licensee 
versus ownership issue.  The Federal Circuit, which does not normally deal with 
copyright issues, addressed whether software licensees were owners of software in DSC 
Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc.50  In DSC, the plaintiff 
manufactured telecommunications infrastructure equipment and copyrighted the software 
required to run the equipment.51  The defendant manufactured hardware that served the 
same function as DSC’s hardware but required the use of DSC’s copyrighted software to 
properly function.52  Regional bell operating companies (RBOCs), which had licensed 
DSC’s software, installed the software on equipment that the defendant manufactured.  
The plaintiffs objected, claiming such use was a violation of the software licensing 
agreement.53 
¶18  The Federal Circuit criticized the Ninth Circuit’s decision in MAI, indicating it 
established an “overly simplistic” rule.54  It claimed that the Ninth Circuit’s rule “fail[ed] 
to recognize the distinction between ownership of a copyright, which can be licensed, and 
ownership of copies of the copyrighted software.”55  As a result, the Federal Circuit 
declined to “adopt the Ninth Circuit’s characterization of all licensees as non-owners,” 
adopting instead a test that looks at the incidents of ownership.56  However, despite its 
criticism of the MAI rule, the DSC court ultimately held that the RBOCs were not owners 
 
46 Id. at 1333 (stating that licensees of the software could not repair their software due to a restrictive 
license). 
47 Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 2006). 
48 Id. at 776. 
49 Id. at 785. 
50 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
51 Id. at 1358. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 1360. 
54 Id. at 1362. 
55 Id. at 1360 (citing 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08[B][1], at 
8-119 to 1-121 (3d ed. 1997)). 
56 Id.  Although it declined to follow MAI, the DSC court acknowledged the similarity in finding a mere 
license where the software agreement “imposed more severe restrictions on Peak’s rights with respect to 
the software than would be imposed on a party who owned copies of software subject only to the rights of 
the copyright holder under the Copyright Act.” Id. 
Vol. 10:3] Terence Leong 
 
245 
of the software.  Therefore, they were not entitled to the § 117 defense because the 
license stipulated that “[a]ll rights, title, and interest in the Software are and shall remain 
with seller, subject . . . to a license to Buyer to use the Software solely in conjunction 
with” DSC’s equipment.57 
¶19  The Second Circuit is often at odds with the Ninth Circuit on copyright issues.58  
Taking the Federal Circuit’s view of MAI as a cue, the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Krause v. Titleserv, Inc. further fleshed out the distinction between licenses and sales for 
the purposes of § 117.59  In Krause, the plaintiff, software developer Krause, developed 
and copyrighted software under a consulting arrangement for defendant Titleserv.60  
Before terminating the consulting relationship with Titleserv, Krause entered into an oral 
agreement with the CEO of Titleserv that the software Krause developed would remain 
his.61  Instead of transferring title to the software, Krause granted Titleserv a license to 
use, but not modify, the software.62 
¶20  Discussing the appropriate standard for determining ownership for the purposes of 
§ 117, the Krause court considered two possible standards:  (1) a standard like that 
articulated in MAI under which § 117 benefits are restricted to title owners and (2) the 
standard articulated in DSC, which “attache[s] less importance to formal title, looking 
rather at the various incidents of ownership.”63  The Krause court ultimately decided to 
adopt the DSC standard for two reasons.  First, whether a party possesses formal title is 
generally a matter of state law, and “[i]f § 117(a) required formal title, two software 
users, engaged in substantively identical transactions might find that one is liable for 
copyright infringement while the other is protected” simply because they live in different 
states and are subject to different state laws.64  Second, the court found it “anomalous” 
for a user whose ownership of a copy was so complete that he may lawfully use it and 
keep it forever to be unable to fix or make an archival copy of the software.65  Applying 
this standard, the court found that Titleserv was an owner of the copies of the software 
that Krause authorized it to use, stating multiple factors that suggest ownership rather 
than restrictive license.66 
 
57 Id. at 1361 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
58 For example, the Second Circuit has a different analysis of substantial similarity than the Ninth Circuit. 
Compare Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating 
there is a “qualitative” and “quantitative” view, requiring at least a de minimis amount of copying), with 
Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 825 (9th Cir. 2002) (using a much broader “total concept 
and feel” test). 
59 See Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2005). 
60 Id. at 120. 
61 Id. at 124. 
62 Id. at 121. 
63 Id. at 123. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 124 (“Titleserv paid Krause substantial consideration to develop the programs for its sole benefit.  
Krause customized the software to serve Titleserv’s operations.  The copies were stored on a server owned 
by Titleserv.  Krause never reserved the right to repossess the copies used by Titleserv and agreed that 
Titleserv had the right to continue to possess and use the programs forever, regardless whether its 
relationship with Krause terminated.  Titleserv was similarly free to discard or destroy the copies any time 
it wished.”). 




IV. VERNOR V. AUTODESK 
A. The Facts 
¶21  In Vernor, the plaintiff used eBay to sell copies of the defendant Autodesk’s 
copyrighted software program AutoCAD in 2005 and 2007.67  However, the versions of 
AutoCAD that Vernor sold were not packaged and approved by Autodesk; rather, he sold 
what the district court deemed “AutoCAD packages.”68  These AutoCAD packages 
consisted of an “Autodesk-commissioned box” with a “jewel case” and a compact disc 
copy of AutoCAD inside it, sealed with a sticker claiming the software was “subject to 
the license agreement that appears during the installation process or is included in the 
package.”69  The packages also included a copy of the Autodesk Software License 
Agreement (SLA) and “possibly other documentation.”70  Vernor obtained the 2007 
packages from an architecture firm that held a sale of office equipment.  Although the 
architecture firm had broken the seal on the jewel case in each AutoCAD package, the 
parties agreed that the packages themselves were authentic.71 
¶22  The SLA for AutoCAD places significant restrictions on the use and transfer of 
users of AutoCAD software.  The SLA (1) states that Autodesk retains title to all copies, 
(2) grants the customer a nonexclusive and nontransferable license to use the software, 
(3) prohibits customers from renting, leasing, or transferring the software without 
Autodesk’s prior consent, (4) imposes “significant use restrictions” that, among other 
things, prohibit the licensee from disassembling the software, removing any notices, and 
defeating the copy protection, (5) provides for a license termination for unauthorized 
copying or use, and (6) provides that if the licensee chooses to upgrade the software, the 
licensee must destroy any previous copies of the software.72 
¶23  Autodesk invoked the “take-down” provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA) upon discovering Vernor’s eBay operation in both 2005 and 2007.73  Both 
takedowns resulted in delayed sales for Vernor, and in the 2007 takedown, eBay barred 
Vernor from selling anything on its site for a month.74  Believing that the first sale 
doctrine applied to his software sales and that he therefore did not violate § 106, Vernor 
filed suit for a declaratory judgment, intending to bar further DMCA takedown actions 
against his operation.  Autodesk, on the other hand, claimed that it never transferred title 
of the AutoCAD software packages to the architecture firm.75  Rather, Autodesk claimed 
that the architecture firm breached its license to operate AutoCAD when it upgraded to a 
newer version of the software and sold the copies to Vernor.76  Whether Vernor was 
 
67 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1336, 1337 (W.D. Wash. 2009), vacated, 621 F.3d 1102 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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entitled to declaratory judgment hinged on whether the architecture firm purchased 
AutoCAD software in sales or licenses.77 
B. The District Court:  There Was a Sale, Not Simply a License 
¶24  The district court held that first sale doctrine applied to software, observing two 
different lines of binding precedent:  Wise and the MAI trio.78  The court interpreted Wise 
to hold that a transfer of copyrighted works under restrictive licenses that allow for the 
physical transfer of media, but do not specify a date to return the media, could be seen as 
a sale.79  The district court held that Autodesk granted a license to the architecture firm 
similar to the Redgrave license in Wise because the AutoCAD license and the Redgrave 
license were both subject to terms that vested “title in the copy to the copyright holder, 
but made no provision for the copyright holder to regain possession of the copy.”80  
Because Autodesk transferred the copies of AutoCAD to the architectural firm with no 
expectation that it would regain control of the copies, the district court found that under 
Wise, the AutoCAD license would transfer ownership of the software copy despite the 
restrictions present in the license.81 
¶25  The district court then analyzed the facts under the rule adopted by the MAI trio.  It 
admitted that under the MAI cases, Autodesk would prevail because the AutoCAD copies 
were transferred pursuant to a restrictive license.82  Despite expert testimony on 
Autodesk’s behalf by David Nimmer, author of the leading copyright treatise83 
suggesting otherwise, the court held that Wise and MAI articulated conflicting rules.84  It 
then chose to apply Wise, following the admittedly weak rule that it “must follow the 
oldest precedent among conflicting opinions from three-judge Ninth Circuit panels.”85 
C. The Ninth Circuit:  There Was Simply a License, Not a Sale 
¶26  The Ninth Circuit took a significantly different view of Wise and the MAI trio than 
the district court.  Instead of determining that the cases were irreconcilable, as the district 
court did, the Ninth Circuit reviewed its precedent regarding the ownership versus 
licensee issue and synthesized a “three consideration” test to determine whether a 
software user is a licensee rather than an owner:  “First, we consider whether the 
copyright owner specifies that a user is granted a license.  Second, we consider whether 
the copyright owner significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software.  
Finally, we consider whether the copyright owner imposes notable use restrictions.”86 
 
77 Id. at 1107. 
78 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1336, 1341–46 (W.D. Wash. 2009), vacated, 621 F.3d 
1102 (9th Cir. 2010). 
79 Id. at 1342.  The district court’s decision was based primarily on the Wise court’s discussion of the 
license attached to the Redgrave sale of Camelot. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 1343–44. 
82 Id. at 1344–45. 
83  NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 15. 
84 Vernor, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346 (“With two sets of conflicting precedent before the court, the 
question becomes which to follow.”). 
85 Id. (citing United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
86 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2010). 




¶27  The Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that one of its goals in synthesizing the new 
three-consideration test was to “reconcile[] the MAI trio and Wise, even though the MAI 
trio did not cite Wise.”87  Under its newly formulated rule, the Ninth Circuit found first 
that “Autodesk retained title to the software,” as stipulated in the SLA.88  With regard to 
the second consideration, it found that Autodesk “imposed significant transfer 
restrictions” as “the software could not be transferred or leased without Autodesk’s 
written consent.”89  Finally, with regard to the third consideration, the SLA imposed 
many usage restrictions.90  Because Autodesk sold AutoCAD pursuant to the SLA and 
the architecture firm was bound by the SLA, the court held that the firm was a licensee 
rather than an “owner of a particular copy” of AutoCAD.91 
D. The Ninth Circuit’s Vernor Test Is Contrary to the Second Circuit’s Krause Test 
¶28  The three-factor test articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Vernor grants much more 
power to software copyright holders and makes it more likely that a modern software 
purchase will be a license rather than a first sale.  However, in dismissing plaintiff 
Vernor’s counterarguments, the Ninth Circuit claimed that it was not creating a circuit 
split with the Federal Circuit’s decision in DSC or the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Krause when it articulated its new rule.92  The Ninth Circuit’s characterization of the 
allegedly contrary authority in the other circuits is at least partially true.  With its 
recasting of the rule articulated by the MAI trio, the Ninth Circuit effectively brought 
DSC into the fold of its framework, as DSC hinged on whether the software copyright 
holder retained title to the work.93 
¶29  While it was appropriate for the Ninth Circuit to distinguish DSC given the facts of 
the case and relevant case law, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the Second Circuit’s decision 
in Krause too quickly.  The Ninth Circuit gave little weight to the restrictive license in 
Krause because the parties did not have a written license agreement, and Titleserv paid 
Krause “significant consideration” to develop software for its sole benefit.94  It then, 
without much analysis, concluded that “the facts and the analysis in Krause are not 
contrary to our determination that [the architecture firm] is a licensee rather than an 
owner.”95  In dismissing Krause, the Ninth Circuit ignored the restrictive nature of the 
license at issue in Krause. 
¶30  In fact, if the Ninth Circuit applied its test to the facts in Krause, it would have 
reached a contrary result.  The first Vernor consideration is “whether the copyright owner 
specifies that the user is granted a license.”96  Krause explicitly made an oral contract 
 
87 Id. at 1111. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1111–12 (“The SLA also imposed use restrictions against the use of the software outside the 
Western Hemisphere and against modifying, translating, or reverse-engineering the software, removing any 
proprietary marks from the software or documentation, or defeating any copy protection device.”). 
91 Id. at 1112. 
92 Id. at 1114. 
93 DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc’ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
94 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1114. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1110. 
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with the CEO of Titleserv that the company would merely have a license to his 
copyrighted software, not ownership.97  This is analogous to the AutoCAD license in 
Vernor, which explicitly stipulates that Autodesk retains all title to AutoCAD software.98  
The second Vernor consideration is “whether the copyright owner significantly restricts 
the user’s ability to transfer the software.”99  While Krause may not have explicitly 
forbade Titleserv from selling the software to another individual, this consideration is 
moot because the software Krause wrote was only applicable to Titleserv’s internal 
company operations and not readily adaptable to another business.100 
¶31  The third Vernor consideration is whether the agreement imposes notable use 
restrictions.101  This consideration would have weighed heavily in Krause’s favor, as 
Krause was very explicit in his terms that his software was not to be modified or 
decompiled; he went to great lengths to remove all source code from the Titleserv 
offices.102  Krause’s intentions were analogous to the significant use restrictions in the 
AutoCAD License, which restrict the user from decompiling or otherwise modifying the 
software.103  Therefore, under the Vernor test, Krause would have easily meet a burden of 
proving that Titleserv was not an owner of the software who was entitled to the § 117(a) 
essential step defense. 
¶32  While the Second Circuit in Krause addressed the ownership issue for the purposes 
of the § 117(a) essential step defense, the Ninth Circuit in Vernor considered the 
ownership issue for the purposes of the § 109 first sale doctrine.  Although courts have 
held that the two meanings of ownership are the same, the Ninth Circuit’s Vernor test for 
ownership has not yet been applied to a fact pattern concerning the essential step defense.  
While the Ninth Circuit is not obligated to follow the Second Circuit’s different reading 
of the ownership–licensee dichotomy, the split between the two circuits shows that the 
distinction between licensees and owners is far from settled on the national scale. 
V. POLICY ARGUMENTS BEHIND VERNOR 
A. Finding First Sales in Software Purchases 
¶33  In formulating its rule in Vernor, the Ninth Circuit considered, but did not afford 
any weight to, a number of amici briefs that weighed on each side of the issue.  Vernor’s 
brief and those of the amici who sided with Vernor, eBay and the American Library 
Association (ALA), emphasized traditional property rights that favor alienability and the 
constitutional purpose behind copyright that favors dissemination of copyrighted works.  
Vernor emphasized the “law’s aversion to restraints on alienation of personal 
property.”104  In light of this aversion, Vernor argued that the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
“ignores the economic realities of the relevant transactions, in which the copyright owner 
permanently released software copies into the stream of commerce without expectation of 
 
97 Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005). 
98 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1104. 
99 Id. at 1111. 
100 Krause, 402 F.3d at 129. 
101 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111. 
102 Krause, 402 F.3d at 121. 
103 See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111. 
104 Id. at 1115. 




return in exchange for upfront payment of the full software price.”105  Additionally, 
Vernor argued the decision would place an unworkable standard for those who wish to 
participate in secondary markets, as it would “force everyone purchasing copyrighted 
property to trace the chain of title to ensure that a first sale occurred.”106  In the same 
vein, eBay argued that 
a broad view of the first sale doctrine is necessary to facilitate the creation of 
secondary markets for copyrighted works, which contributes to the public good 
by (1) giving consumers additional opportunities to purchase and sell copyrighted 
works, often at below-retail prices; (2) allowing consumers to obtain copies of 
works after a copyright owner has ceased distribution; and (3) allowing the 
proliferation of businesses.107 
¶34  Finally, the ALA argued that the court’s decision would “(1) undermine[] 17 
U.S.C. § 109(b)(2), which permits non-profit libraries to lend software for non-
commercial purposes, and (2) would hamper efforts by non-profits to collect and preserve 
out-of-print software.”108  Additionally, “[t]he ALA fear[ed] that the software industry’s 
licensing practices could be adopted by other copyright owners, including book 
publishers, record labels, and movie studios.”109 
¶35  Those who argue in favor of finding ownership in software licenses, such as Vernor 
and eBay, find support in the scholarly community.  Scholars, looking at the district 
court’s decision in Vernor and the Second Circuit’s decision in Krause, are more willing 
to construe a license as a sale.110  Some commentators have even advocated for a 
legislative modification of the copyright regime to extend the first sale doctrine to most 
transfers that are normally seen as licenses.111 
B. Finding Licenses in Software Purchases 
¶36  A number of parties, including Autodesk, the Software and Information Industry 
Association, and the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), filed briefs with 
policy arguments in support of the Ninth Circuit’s result in Vernor.  Autodesk argued that 
such restrictive licensing agreements “allow[] for tiered pricing for different software 
markets, such as reduced pricing for students or educational institutions,” thus increasing 
access for users of its software.112  Additionally, Autodesk argued that requiring all users 







110 See, e.g., Ted Claypoole, How a License Becomes a Sale: Software Applications of the First Sale 
Doctrine, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 2823 (analyzing how first sale doctrine is turning licensees into 
purchasers). 
111 See, e.g., Joshua W. Newman, Note, Selling the Right to License: Examination of the First Sale Doctrine 
Through the Lens of UMG Recordings & Quanta Computer, 35 J. CORP. L. 849 (2010) (arguing that 
Congress should embrace the recent decisions that extend the first sale doctrine and legislatively revise 
those principles to protect consumer privileges). 
112 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1114. 
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consumers by spreading costs among a large number of purchasers.”113  Finally, 
Autodesk maintained that the decision would “reduce[] the incidence of piracy by 
allowing copyright owners to bring infringement actions against unauthorized 
resellers.”114  The MPAA had a more practical policy reason to disfavor granting 
licensees ownership status, stating “there is often no practically feasible way for a 
consumer to return a copy [of software] to the copyright owner.”115 
¶37  Scholars who advocate for the licensing view over ownership focus on the 
changing nature of intellectual property and technology on and how the older precedent 
of § 109 does not apply in a modern context.  Despite several attempts to bring it into 
compliance with modern technology, commentators argue that the copyright statute has 
not captured the proper level of protection for non-physical copyrighted works.116  
Ultimately, affirmative defenses and the current copyright regime make sense when 
consumers obtain physical manifestations of the intellectual property; unfortunately for 
copyright holders and Congress, the regime falls short in determining how to deal with 
non-physical media.117 
VI. RECONCILING VERNOR AND KRAUSE:  SEPARATING THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE FROM 
THE ESSENTIAL STEP DEFENSE 
¶38  There are now two ways to address the ownership issue for §§ 109 and 117(a):  the 
Ninth Circuit’s three consideration test presented in Vernor and the Second Circuit’s 
incidences of ownership test presented in Krause.  The Second Circuit’s incidence of 
ownership test grants users broader rights to use and adapt software, which is in line with 
the Copyright Clause’s goal of dissemination of copyrighted work.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
test, however, falls on the other side of the copyright policy debate, granting more 
protection to copyright owners to foster the creation of their works. 
¶39  One way to reconcile the Second and Ninth Circuits’ tests is to limit each to the 
affirmative defense that raised it.  Each test serves different purposes and is an exception 
to a different exclusive right of the copyright holder.  The essential step defense, at issue 
in Krause, is a modern element of the copyright regime that has been adapted to reflect 
the needs of software consumers and copyright holders.  The first sale doctrine, on the 
other hand, is largely unchanged from the standard originally articulated by the Supreme 
 
113 Id. at 1114–15. 
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116 See, e.g., Robert H. Rotstein et al., The First Sale Doctrine in the Digital Age, 22 INTELL. PROP. & 
TECH. L.J. 23 (2010) (arguing that the nature of intangible property requires a re-assessment of how 
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Copyright in a Digital World, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1375 (2007) (arguing that the current copyright legal regime 
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likely in the digital space, to effectively regulate non-physical intellectual property). 
117 Nika Aldrich, Note, An Exploration of Rights Management Technologies Used in the Music Industry, 
2007 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 051001 available at http://bciptf.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/25-
AN-EXPLORATION-OF-RIGHTS-MANAGEMENT-TECHNOLOGIES-USED-IN-THE-MUSIC-
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Court in Bobbs-Merrill in 1908, a time when intellectual property was still inextricably 
tied to physical media. 
A. The Essential Step Defense Warrants Reading Software Sales as Purchases 
¶40  The essential step defense was created to protect the interests of both software 
buyers and copyright holders.  The Second Circuit came to its decision in Krause because 
it found that limiting the essential step defense to those who were owners of the software 
would lead to an absurd result, a sentiment shared by Congress when it amended § 109 in 
the wake of MAI.  One need not look further than the facts of MAI, where copyright law 
barred a computer owner from hiring an individual of his choice to service his own 
computer.118  If the court had refused to read ownership into Krause, an even more 
absurd result would surface:  a company that commissioned someone to write software 
for it, yet failed to properly contract to retain title to the software, would be unable to 
repair or adapt its systems to a changing world. 
¶41  Such a reading of the owner requirement places too much power in the hands of 
software copyright owners.  Instead of just controlling the reproduction of copyrighted 
software, the exclusive reproductive right would also preclude software customers from 
allowing any other entity but the copyright holder from servicing the software.  Such 
power does not serve the creation or dissemination incentives of the copyright regime.  
Therefore, interpreting the owner requirement in the essential step defense makes sense 
in the context the essential step defense serves. 
B. The First Sale Doctrine Warrants Reading Software Transfers as Licenses 
¶42  The first sale doctrine, on the other hand, makes less sense in the context of 
medium-less intellectual property, such as digital music files, eBooks, and software 
purchased on the Internet.  Often, such purchases are linked to a user who is a real 
person, rather than a physical manifestation of the copyrighted work (e.g., a book or a 
CD).  The policy reasons behind the first sale doctrine established in Bobbs-Merrill are 
rooted in a copyright regime that assumes the existence of physical media and the higher 
cost to distribute and disseminate physical media. 
¶43  One policy rationale behind the first sale doctrine is based on the difference 
between ownership of a copyrighted work and ownership of a particular copy of that 
work.119  While this distinction is as relevant now as it was when copyrighted works were 
disseminated at bookstores on books and records, the idea of the first sale doctrine as a 
proper limit to the exclusive distribution right makes less sense with media-less sales of 
intellectual property.  When a consumer had to buy a physical copy of a copyrighted 
work to access the work, there was a tangible property right in the copy of the book 
purchased.  This model of ownership of a copy of a copyrighted work falls short in 
today’s world of digital distribution, for there oftentimes are no physical, tangible objects 
 
118 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 1993). 
119 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 604 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[W]here a copyright owner 
parts with title to a particular copy of his copyrighted work, he divests himself of his exclusive right to 
vend that particular copy.”); see also Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) (“The 
purchaser of a book, once sold by authority of the owner of the copyright, may sell it again, although he 
could not publish a new edition of it.”). 
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that a consumer owns.  At some extremes, such as online gaming or video streaming 
subscriptions, such purchases are better seen as purchases of the ability to access a 
specific service rather than the purchase of a copy of a particular piece of intellectual 
property.120  The traditional property rule against limiting alienability makes little sense if 
the property at issue is a monthly subscription to an online gaming service.  With the 
increasing digital distribution of all forms of copyrighted work, the distinction of 
ownership between the copyrighted work and that of the copy of the work is breaking 
down.  While it is clear that the copyright owner still owns the fruits of his creative labor, 
it less clear that the copyright consumer owns the MP3 file on her iPod, the eBook on her 
Kindle, or the app on her iPhone in the same way that a purchaser of a physical book 
owns the paper that the book is printed on. 
¶44  Another policy rationale behind the first sale doctrine is that it exists to further the 
public dissemination of copyrighted works by allowing for secondary markets.121  In 
much of the twentieth century, there were extremely high barriers to the dissemination of 
creative works due to the fact that a work had to be disseminated on physical media.  As 
Internet-based services such as iTunes and YouTube show, it is much easier now for 
individuals to disseminate their creative works.122  To protect their intellectual property in 
today’s age of free information sharing on the Internet, software companies are shifting to 
medium-less sales and focusing more on server–client based systems.123  Google built its 
entire business without ever distributing one box of software, Blizzard and Microsoft 
embraced the social gaming paradigm shift and built their models on selling clients to 
their game systems, and Apple, having revolutionized the mobile space by creating the 
first viable application store for mobile phones, is moving to create an entirely virtual 
market for computer applications.124 
VII. CONCLUSION 
¶45  The copyright regime is best understood as balancing two competing incentives of 
consumers and producers.  First, it grants authors exclusive rights to their works to 
 
120 See, e.g., World of Warcraft Terms of Use, BLIZZARD ENT., http://us.blizzard.com/en-
us/company/legal/wow_tou.html (last updated Dec. 9, 2010) (“The Game includes two components:  (a) 
the software program along with any accompanying materials or documentation (collectively, the ‘Game 
Client’), and (b) Blizzard’s proprietary World of Warcraft online service (the ‘Service’).”). 
121 See, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV. 
577, 586 (2003) (“The first sale doctrine also provides many consumers the chance to purchase a copy of 
the work at a price lower than that charged by the copyright owner or by the initial retailer . . . by allowing 
the development of secondary markets for the sale of copies.”); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social 
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http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2011-03-01-videogames01_CV_N.htm. 




incentivize the creation of artistic works.  Second, the copyright regime limits the rights 
of copyright holders so that copyrighted works can be widely disseminated.  The first sale 
doctrine and essential step defense are exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright 
holders that serve to strike the proper balance between the competing incentives of 
copyright holders and consumers.  While both exceptions enable consumers to perform 
acts that are normally reserved to copyright authors, both the essential step and first sale 
doctrine require that any individual invoking the defense be an owner of the particular 
copy at issue; the implication being that those using copyrighted works under restrictive 
licenses cannot enjoy the defenses in the same way that an owner can. 
¶46  As technology has progressed and the nature of copyrighted material has shifted 
from physical media to software, courts have struggled to strike the proper balance 
between incentivizing authors to create works and allowing the widespread dissemination 
of those works.  At the same time, software authors have increasingly attempted to 
protect their creations by using licenses to contract around the essential step defense and 
first sale doctrine.  As a result, different circuit courts have interpreted the ownership 
versus licensee debate differently, resulting in differing standards.  One way to reconcile 
the difference in conflicting standards in the circuits is to restrict each standard to the 
defense in which the standard was articulated; the Ninth Circuit’s standard was created in 
a first sale case, while the Second Circuit’s standard was created in an essential step case.  
Such a solution would not only reconcile the split between the circuits, but would also 
recognize that the essential step defense and first sale doctrine address different exclusive 
rights, each of which requires a different balance between authors and consumers. 
  
